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SELF-REGULATION AS A REMEDY FOR MARKET TURMOIL:  
AN OVER-THE-COUNTER OR A PRESCRIPTION DRUG? 
Abstract:  The paper tackles the problem of the overwhelming regulatory burden that marks its 
presence in a post-crisis environment. With evidence of regulatory overload in some cases, paths for 
more effective design of regulatory frameworks should be sought. Although self-regulation does not 
enjoy favorable publicity and happens to fail to prove its value in times of distress, it still may serve 
as a remedy. A number of studies shows that, under specific circumstances, the self-regulatory 
framework may operate seamlessly for the benefit of all stakeholders. The goal of this paper is to 
identify these circumstances and validate them on the basis of three concise case studies from the 
health care, advertising and financial services industry. It is instructive for policy makers in 
deciding on whether to abandon or reduce public oversight in certain areas, by allowing businesses 
more freedom in terms of setting and enforcing the rules. 
Keywords:  self-regulation, self-regulatory organization, regulatory agencies, financial crisis, 
financial services industry, health care industry, advertising industry 
INTRODUCTION 
Whatever the new paradigm of market regulation will turn out to be, it will emerge from the 
ashes of the current financial crisis. The legacy of austerity, public discontent, and citizens’ greater 
vigilance to corporate misconduct, is likely to leave its stamp on it. The rising regulatory pressure 
emerged as a powerful trend, with the role of regulators growing in significance. This pertains first 
and foremost to the financial services industry, where the amount of regulations has been growing 
unceasingly since the outbreak of the downturn. Heavy regulations of ecological nature are also 
imposed on sectors dealing with energy production, raw materials or building materials. 
The overload of regulations may take two forms: the extended coverage of regulatory activities 
that embraces industries that do not need them; and the elevated scrutiny in regulation, which 
hinders economic freedom to an unjustified degree. Customer-centrism, the most desired virtue of 
regulation, decays. The fraction of laws that directly protect customer interest is on remarkable 
decline. The regulators boost their statistics on the number of bills passed, but are often thought to 
overlook the utility that should be delivered to ultimate beneficiaries. The Volcker rule or the 
pressure on regulating the “buyer beware” vehicles, such as private equity or hedge funds 821, 
could be put forth as examples. In several sectors, the far-flung influence of regulators hampers 
innovation and curbs entrepreneurship. To introduce a new regulation means to draw the firm away 
from its core business and make it produce compliance reports and hire consultants.  
The once defined basic institutions of capitalism not only remain basic, but enjoy a leading role 
in the economy and garner political blessing. Over-regulating is typically associated with developed 
countries (budget of the U.S. regulatory universe amounts to 60 bn USD, i.e. roughly two thirds of 
Poland’s total budget revenue), but the drift towards excessive zeal infests, e.g. to China 20. The 
costs of public intervention often outweigh the benefits it intends to convey. 
Hence, the aim of this paper is to bring about a more conscious application of self-regulatory 
efforts, being the surrogate for public regulation. They should be given more trust and room for 
development in industries that are best positioned in this respect. The paper features three case 
studies from different sectors, in an attempt to detect the characteristics of these industries, which 
enabled successful private oversight. The term “self-regulation” (alternatively, “private oversight”) 
embodies a situation in which an independent self-regulatory organization (later referred to as SRO) 
exercises regulatory authority over a certain industry or profession, exclusively or to a certain 
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extent. It has to be suitably empowered to perform its duties, either through an explicit government 
imprimatur (probably in the form of “enforced” self-regulation), a carte blanche for the SRO, or 
through a pre-emptive move of the SRO, tacitly consented by the public authorities. 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The criticism around self-regulation rests on the conviction that the quality of oversight would 
suffer. First, although competitive markets are second to none in terms of efficient production of 
private goods and accurate allocation of scarce resources, they do not reward market actors for 
taking care of public welfare. Second, the argument of disastrous market imperfections, unavoidable 
in self-regulation, is raised. Responding to the first caveat: is public surveillance of a truly superior 
quality? An average UK small firm has a chance to be controlled for workforce safety once every 80 
years [1]. Simultaneously, the level of stress and costs to be borne are high. In this respect, public 
watchdogs do not hold a candle to their private counterparts. With regard to the second claim, 
Spinello [22] reminds us of a widespread bias that “market failures” are given more publicity than 
“government failures”, while the latter are far more evident. Therefore, unless the existence of a 
regulator freed from imperfections is ensured, the complaint lacks validation. 
Some critics say that self-regulation is a new weapon of despaired Wall Street sinners, willing 
to trade orthodox scrutiny for the meaningless trinket of self-regulation. Certainly, ceding regulatory 
clout to industry is not a life-saving pill. But it might be a risk diversification tool that will wipe out 
the overkill of regulators and voice the needs of businesses, making them weigh more in decision 
making processes. However, self-regulation is not a one-size-fits-all approach. Frameworks should 
be carefully crafted and take into account the peculiarity of different economic sectors and different 
jurisdictions, as well as the feature that public and private regulations may complement each other 
[17], which is actually desirable. The empirical harvest is quite edifying, e.g. López-Gamero et al. 
[18] proved that voluntary norms have an edge over the command-and-control model. Haufler [12] 
provides some evidence of improved industry practices, but also delivers counterarguments by 
stating that self-regulation faces considerable organizational and enforcement difficulties and is 
sometimes unlikely to respond effectively to the underlying challenges. Indeed, the issue of 
observance of SRO endorsements is problematic in some frameworks, but it is crucial to note that 
SROs are designed rather to disentangle disputes than to punish for non-compliance. 
Between the extremes of pure play self-regulation and pure play state regulation, there is the 
so-called enforced self-regulation. In this framework, the state strives to co-opt the regulatory 
potential of corporations. Such mixed approaches have been extensively researched, yielding both: 
red flags [13] as well as more neutral conclusions [17], and quite enthusiastic inferences [19]. It is 
difficult to define the superior incarnation of justice and effectiveness, but it surely would feature 
some amalgamation of self-regulation and government shackles. Unfortunately, self-regulation is 
apparently not taken seriously by many influential scholars. Stiglitz [23] labels self-regulation as an 
oxymoron. In their recent publication, Brunnermeier et al. [5] seem to ostensibly neglect self-
regulation, thus presumably expressing their vote of no confidence. Cukierman [7] distrusts the 
whole genre of SROs, driven by the recent moral abuses by top management. 
Has the golden age for self-regulation already passed? Despite the critical stances, it is hardly 
plausible. Provided that conventional oversight is experiencing its dark ages, the opportunity for 
refurbishing self-regulation arises. How do we harness SROs effectively for collective social 
benefit? 
SCIENTIFIC HYPOTHESES 
Based on the qualitative analysis of available case studies, several hypotheses may be drafted 
in order to identify the industries in which SROs may add value and become or remain a credible 
source of regulation. These preconditions are enumerated below. 
1. Historical evidence that public opinion is satisfied with the performance of SRO. This is 
somewhat the easiest prerequisite, as it rests on a broad status quo consensus. 
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2. Market players are embedded with the capability to effectively control each other and exhibit a 
true commitment to do so. The motivation for ethical conduct and genuine mutual control must 
be in place until the misbehaviour of one firm proves detrimental to its peers, prompting the 
deterioration of the whole sector’s image. 
3. A market involving very complicated, interdisciplinary knowledge, with numerous 
interdependencies. This would make the headhunting for skilled public regulators futile or the 
authorities would incur huge costs when staffing the regulatory body. 
4. An environment in which quick decisions are needed, and the public regulators, inherently slow-
moving, are not well-positioned to satisfy this precondition. The perfect example of such an 
environment is the Internet, where self-regulation has recently attracted much attention, although 
this trend has its contenders, too. 
5. A market which is out of or remote from the epicentre of public interest. The institutions are not 
subject to instigate systemic problems or the parties affected by their potential malfunctioning 
are limited in number or well-qualified to detect the malfunctioning using their own skills (e.g. 
accredited investors, involved in hedge funds or venture capital industries). This condition seems 
to be the most difficult to satisfy. 
One must notice that the aforementioned list indicates that if the enumerated prerequisites are 
met, the existence of SROs is facilitated. However, it cannot evaluate a priori the effectiveness of 
their operations and, consequently, the quality of the regulations introduced by them. 
The break-even point, at which the public authority should step in to ensure soundness of 
regulation, is when the conflict of interest within an industry is deemed too severe and hampers 
impartiality. The need for external supervision in such cases has been suggested in literature [6].  
RESEARCH ISSUE 
This paper is anticipated to lay foundations for the “targeted” self-regulation idea, i.e. the 
selective application of the private oversight model, basing on thorough analysis of market 
characteristics. A series of brief case studies will facilitate the accomplishment of this objective. 
In the case of the medical industry the situation is unsophisticated. There are three broadly 
defined self-regulated dimensions in medical professions: standards by which people may enter the 
profession and practice medicine; teaching the medical community how to properly apply those 
standards; enforcing those standards and disciplining for non-compliance [4]. The medical society 
was granted the privilege of self-regulation in the middle of the 19th century [16]. This signifies the 
magnitude of the status quo (requirement no. 1), since the subsequent four preconditions are either 
partially satisfied or not satisfied at all. The prerequisite no. 2 is ambiguous. On one hand, unethical 
or incompetent doctors may spoil the reputation of the entire profession [14]. On the other hand, 
doctors belong to a hardly substitutable profession and may be immune from public dissatisfaction. 
However, this is the arousing conflict of interest that marked the slow downfall of self-regulation in 
this industry, as public opinion has become sceptical of the physicians’ ability to balance altruism 
and self-interests. As for the complexity of knowledge, the discrepancy between practitioners and 
the general public is still considerable, although many decades ago it seemed much more immense 
[6]. SROs, such as the American Medical Association in the United States or the General Medical 
Council in the United Kingdom, still remain a vital element of the social contract. Their Polish 
counterpart is the Chamber of Physicians and Dentists (Naczelna Izba Lekarska) that is also deeply 
rooted in history, being founded in 1921.  
The Commission of Ethics in Advertising (Komisja Etyki Reklamy, later referred to as KER)  
illustrates the simplicity of the regulatory regime. KER is a Polish-based SRO, founded by 
marketing agencies, the media and enterprises. It is an arbitration body of the Advertising Council, 
which is part of the Europe-wide EASA (European Advertising Standards Alliance, grouping 35 
SROs). Consumers who are disgusted or misled by any piece of ad submit a written complaint to 
KER, which is later judged by independent referees. All signatories of the code of ethics have a 
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formal duty to obey the verdicts and withdraw their advertisements in case they have been found to 
be in breach of the code’s provisions, but membership also entitles them to use the label “I advertise 
ethically” for marketing purposes. The advertising industry has been traditionally operating under 
self-regulatory models in most European countries, as well as overseas (e.g. the Advertising Self-
Regulatory Council in the United States), although some public oversight is also present in several 
jurisdictions. Other preconditions are fulfilled: first, the damage caused by unethical advertisement 
may heavily spoil  the whole industry, therefore mutual control is genuine; second, the environment 
consists of several stakeholders (advertisers, agencies, media), which makes it difficult to capture 
for public authorities; third, unethical commercials call for immediate reaction in order to restrain 
the negative consequences they had prompted (68 per cent of complaints against EASA-associated 
SROs were resolved within one month [11]); fourth, although the implications of a fraudulent ad are 
certainly not so devastating as the aftermath of Wall Street misconducts, there is still some 
component of greater risk (e.g. with pharmaceutical or alcohol ads). 
Finally, to feature the case from the most beleaguered financial industry, the 30-year old 
National Futures Association (NFA) is presented. Contrary to the Advertising Council, membership 
in the NFA is mandatory for everyone conducting business with the public on the U.S. futures 
exchanges. There is a dualism in the origin of regulations, since the NFA was created eight years 
after the state-established Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) in 1974. Throughout 
NFA’s history, the CFTC has authorized the NFA to conduct additional regulatory functions. NFA 
is responsible for market education, setting registration requirements and compliance rules, as well 
as for enforcement and resolving arbitration or mediation claims. Futures contracts are a relatively 
complex sub-segment of the financial sector and are dedicated primarily to corporate entities (or 
high net worth individuals). Nevertheless, the systemic risk component is still present here, as the 
concentration of failed investments may lead to market-wide turmoil, as the case of Amaranth 
Advisors hedge fund instructs [2]. Moreover, the self-regulatory Chicago Mercantile Exchange has 
recently suffered from a wave of criticism for the flaws in futures brokerage firm examination, 
which contributed to the traumatic bankruptcy of MF Global [10]. 
Table 1. The matrix of self-regulation preconditions and their fulfilment in selected industries 
Economic sector Historical consensus 
Commitment 
for control 
Complex 
environment 
Dynamic 
setting 
Limited, non-
systemic risks 
Health care industry Met Ambiguous No longer met Not met Not met 
Advertising industry Ambiguous Met Met Met Ambiguous 
Futures contracts (finance) Met Met Met Met Ambiguous 
Source: own analysis. 
The financial sector's self-governance is not limited to the NFA. In the United Kingdom the 
Financial Services Authority, independent of government and funded entirely by the institutions it 
regulates, has a by far broader scope of competences. However, this entity is being gradually taken 
over by the British government [25], as it has already happened in April 2010 to its judicial body, 
the Financial Services and Markets Tribunal [24]. Hence, the tripartite British regulatory framework 
(i.e. FSA, the central bank, and the Treasury) will soon cease to exist. Seemingly, the self-regulation 
over the full breadth of the financial services industry was unfeasible. The challenge for the future is 
whether we may obtain this wisdom a priori rather than only a posteriori. 
The examples were purposely taken from different segments and cannot be directly compared. 
CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH 
Self-regulation is certainly not an over-the-counter drug, as the conflict of interest in some 
industries may turn out to be unmanageable from the inside, which calls for an external rule-setter. 
However, identifying the attributes of a given sector, decisive for whether self-regulation may be 
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applicable or not, may greatly improve the regulatory standards by increasing the quality of 
regulation and reducing its cost from the taxpayer perspective. Such an approach sees self-
regulation as a prescription drug. The question remains on how to convince policy makers to 
overweight private regulation at the cost of the public one. For the emerging industries, such as the 
Internet, the solution is easy: a pre-emptive move of a self-regulatory actor will most probably 
discourage public authorities from action or will considerably impede this action. However, the 
situation is much more challenging in already established economic sectors. A qualitative shift from 
police-like regulation to coordination-oriented regulation is a moderately plausible concept, since 
vested interests have already petrified the status quo. Regulatory authorities have grown in size and 
influence, and they are now self-protective, immune to changes, unwilling to delegate their bread-
and-butter business to SROs and eager to assure markets of their prominence [15]. This is the point 
where regulators need to be deregulated in order for self-regulation to restore its reliability and 
regain its momentum. It is not to say that the publicly founded and funded organizations have no 
commitment for developing operative regulatory principles. Instead, it is to highlight the 
uncontrolled growth in top-down prescriptive regulations that fail to account for financial sector 
heterogeneity, dynamism and asymmetries of information and thus overshoot their targets [3]. The 
right balance between “state” and “self” should be pursued, as the industries can reasonably be 
expected to be better off with diversified sources of regulation rather than with single-origin rules 
that lead to the accumulation of all imperfections the lack of diversification implies. 
As far as the original contribution to the field of science is concerned, the study – undoubtedly 
a preliminary one – provides an insight into the problem of identifying the targets for self-
regulation. It gives a hint on what market characteristics may be interpreted as a “green light” for 
the application of the private oversight model. Consequently, conventional regulation might be 
forsaken or limited in these industries, and SROs may be equipped with more prerogatives.  
Researching the issue of regulation is problematic for several reasons. First, the actual impact 
and quality of regulatory measures cannot be determined a priori. Second, the motivation of the 
regulator is often opaque, even if it is formally expressed. Some light may be shed on it through 
experimental economics, which is best in detecting and validating behavioural aspects of regulatory 
frameworks. The paper also encourages further research in the field of enforced self-regulation, 
since this model is most feasible in terms of implementation and has showcased some success 
stories. 
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